Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
Bruno Broseta,
Miguel Costa-Gomes and
Vincent Crawford
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego
Abstract:
This paper reports experiments designed to study strategic sophistication, the extent to which behavior in games reflects attempts to predict others' decisions, taking their incentives into account. We studied subjects' initial responses to normal-form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique pure-strategy equilibria without dominance, using a computer interface that allowed them to search for hidden payoff information, while recording their searches. Monitoring subjects' information searches along with their decisions allows us to better understand how their decisions are determined, and subjects' deviations from the search patterns suggested by equilibrium analysis help to predict their deviations from equilibrium decisions.
Keywords: noncooperative games; experimental economics; strategic sophistication; cognition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-07-20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study (2001)
Working Paper: Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study (1998)
Working Paper: Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games:An Experimental Study
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