The Dark Side of Competition for Status

Gary Charness, David Masclet () and Marie Claire Villeval

University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

Abstract: Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentallythe role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’sperformance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher whenindividuals are informed about their relative performance. However, ranking feedback alsofavors disreputable behavior. Some individuals do not hesitate to incur a cost to improve theirrank by sabotaging others’ work or by increasing artificially their own performance. Introducingsabotage opportunities has a strong detrimental effect on performance. Therefore, rankingincentives should be used with care. Inducing group identity discourages sabotage among peersbut increases in-group rivalry.

Keywords: Social and Behavioral Sciences; Status; ranking; feedback; sabotage; doping; competitive preferences; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cwa, nep-exp and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (79)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2014)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2014)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2014)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2012)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2012)
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