Firms' Investments in General Training and the Market for Skilled Labour

Abstract: An adverse selection model is analysed where firms can either train or hire a skilled worker. In equilibrium the market wage is determined by supply and demand. The quality of the supply of skilled labour is negatively biased because workers stem either from firms that shut down or from firms that observed their trainee's bad quality during the training. If less firms shut down this quality deteriorates and the incentive to train increases. The incentive is inefficient, because firms must share the informational rent and because they free-ride. Ex ante workers may wish to increase the firms' bargaining power

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Working Paper: Firm's Investment in General Training and the Market for Skilled Labour (2001)
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