Economic Principles for the Enforcement of Abuse of Dominance Provisions

Chiara Fumagalli and Massimo Motta

No 1431, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: The European Commission (EC) has recently announced its intention to issue Guidelines on exclusionary abuses. In this paper, we explain how economics can and should be used to inform a sound and effects-based approach in the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU. In particular, the EC should be guided only by a consumer welfare standard; exclusive dealing and exclusivity rebates should be subject to a (rebuttable) presumption of harm; price-cost tests are meaningful only for predation and other practices which do not reference rivals; essentiality of the input should not be a requirement for vertical foreclosure cases of any type, but such cases should be limited only to dominant firms that satisfy certain criteria.

JEL-codes: K21 L12 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1431

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