Leadership in Collective Action

Joan Esteban () and Esther Hauk

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.

Keywords: collective contests; leadership; group platform; incentives; sharing rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2008-10-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-net, nep-pol and nep-soc
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Related works:
Working Paper: Leadership in Collective Action (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:756.08

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