Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games

Dominik Karos

No 128706, Climate Change and Sustainable Development from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: The class of games with one apex player is generalized to the class of games with a collection of apex sets. These simple games, together with a power index, canonically induce a hedonic coalition formation game. A monotonicity property of solutions is introduced and its meaning for the induced hedonic game is analyzed. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable partitions are stated and core stable partitions are characterized.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46
Date: 2012-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemcl:128706

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.128706

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