Anonymous Single-Profile Welfarism

Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson

No 269601, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: This note reexamines the single-profile approach to social-choice theory. If an alternative is interpreted as a social state of affairs or a history of the world, it can be argued that a multi-profile approach is inappropriate because the information profile is determined by the set of alternatives. However, single-profile approaches are criticized because of the limitations they impose on the possibility of formulating properties such as anonymity. We suggest an alternative definition of anonymity that applies in a single-profile setting and characterize anonymous single-profile welfarism under a richness assumption.

Keywords: Health Economics and Policy; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11
Date: 2004-03-03
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Related works:
Journal Article: Anonymous Single-profile Welfarism (2006)
Working Paper: Anonymous Single-Profile Welfarism (2004)
Working Paper: Anonymous Single-Profile Welfarism (2004)
Working Paper: ANONYMOUS SINGLE-PROFILE WELFARISM (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269601

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269601

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