The Macroeconomic Policy Mix in a Monetary Union with Flexible Inflation TargetingTorben M. Andersen ()
Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University Abstract: Policy mix problems may arise in a monetary union with centralized monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policy. A consequence of this may be an inappropriate stabilization of shocks. This paper addresses how policy coordination problems are affected by the objectives of the monetary authority. It is shown that non-coordinated fiscal policies tend to be too counter-cyclical in the case of aggregate shocks, and that this bias can be reduced by lowering the weight to output stability in monetary policy. Oppositely, for country-specific shocks non- oordinated fiscal policies tend to be too pro-cyclical and this bias can be reduced by increasing the weight to output stability in monetary policy. Considering the assignment of policy tasks -- within the set of binding policy rules for fiscal- and monetary policy -- it is found that flexible inflation targeting dominates strict inflation targeting. Keywords: EMU; policy-mix; shocks and policy cooperation. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2003-2 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University |
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