Personalized fundraising: A field experiment on threshold matching of donations

Maja Adena and Steffen Huck

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We study a form of threshold matching where donations above a certain threshold are topped up with a fixed amount. We show theoretically that threshold matching can induce crowding in if appropriately personalized. In a field experiment, we explore how thresholds should be chosen depending on past donations. The optimal choice of thresholds is rather bold, approximately 60-75% above past donations. Additionally, we explore how thresholds should be set for new donors as a function of their personal characteristics and demonstrate the benefits of personalization as opposed to setting general thresholds applying to all recipients of a fundraising call.

Keywords: charitable giving; field experiments; matching donations; personalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D12 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020, Revised 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/213864/1/ii19-306r.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Personalized fundraising: A field experiment on threshold matching of donations (2022)
Working Paper: Personalized Fundraising: A Field Experiment on Threshold Matching of Donations (2022)
Working Paper: Personalized fundraising: A field experiment on threshold matching of donations (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2019306r

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