Symbolic knowledge at work: Comitology and learning from experts in European technology policy

Symbolisches Wissen in der europäischen Technologiepolitik: Experten, Lernen und das Ausschusswesen

Kathrin Böhling

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: The execution of EU laws by the European Commission is overseen by an intricate system of committees with national delegates. Comitology procedures were developed to moderate Commission action in policy implementation according to member state interests. Apparently ; though ; comitology has become an instrument of greater rather than less integration in Europe. This paper attempts to account for why this is so ; pointing in particular to the importance of Commission-organized expert groups for interest accommodation with member states. The Commission’s propensity to value expert knowledge for its symbolic functions is the bottom line of this paper’s claim that use of expert knowledge frames the discourse within which agreement is achieved among EU member states for implementing measures. Symbolic knowledge at work bolsters the Commission’s credibility to drive European integration but is inconsistent with what it does at the administrative core of policy implementation. To make this argument ; the paper draws on qualitative research on the administration of European technology policy. It accounts for organizational effects through analysis within an organizational learning framework that links the expert-based formation of knowledge with its use.

Keywords: comitology; expert groups; European technology policy; symbolic knowledge; political organization; organizational learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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