Constraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns

Katharina Huesmann and Achim Wambach

VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Many markets ban monetary transfers. Rather than exogenously imposing this constraint, we introduce discrimination-freeness as a desideratum based on egalitarian objectives. Discrimination-freeness requires that an agent's object assignment is independent of his wealth. We show that money cannot be used to Pareto-improve ordinal and money-free assignments without violating discrimination-freeness. Furthermore, if a discrimination-free assignment of objects and money is implementable then the respective object assignment is also implementable without money. Once money can be used outside a market designer's control, further restrictions than only money-freeness might be required to address discrimination concerns.

Keywords: repugnance; inequality; market design; matching markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D63 H42 I00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ore
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/224636/1/vfs-2020-pid-40464.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Constraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224636

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