Interior collective optimum in a volontary contribution to a public-goods game: an experimental approach

Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We run a public goods experiment with four different treatments. The payoff function is chosen such that the Nash equilibrium (NE) and the collective optimum (CO) are both in the interior of the strategy space. We test the effect of varying the level of the collective optimum on contributions. The results show that contributions increase with the level of the CO.

Keywords: Public goods; Experiments; interior solutions; social dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2004-03-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 17. An experimental paper on public goods
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/exp/papers/0403/0403004.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Interior Collective Optimum in a Volontary Contribution to a Public-Goods Game: An Experimental Approach (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0403004

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