Cournot versus Walras in Dynamic Oligopolies with Memory

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper explores the impact of memory in Cournot oligopolies where firms learn through imitation of success (as suggested in Alchian (1950) and modeled in Vega-Redondo (1997)). As long as memory includes at least one period, the long-run outcomes correspond to all the quantities in the interval tension between the evolutionary stability associated to the walrasian outcome, which relies on inter-firm comparisons of simultaneous profits, and the stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, derived from intertemporal comparisons of profits.

JEL-codes: C72 D83 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-08
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Journal Article: Cournot versus Walras in dynamic oligopolies with memory (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie0110

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