In the shadow of shadow banking: a liquidity perspective
Zehao Liu (),
Ping He () and
Chengbo Xie ()
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Zehao Liu: School of Finance, Renmin University of China
Ping He: School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University
Chengbo Xie: School of Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
Abstract:
Liquidity requirements for commercial banks improve risk-sharing for depositors. Nevertheless, shadow banks, issuing securities with lower liquidity, operate outside such regulatory constraints. In an economy featuring shadow banks with a constant level of liquidity for shadow bank securities, higher liquidity requirements lead to a reduction in aggregate liquidity provision, owing to regulatory arbitrage incentives. Conversely, when the liquidity of shadow bank securities decreases with the market share of shadow banks, the incentive for regulatory arbitrage is reduced, and thus higher liquidity requirements could enhance aggregate liquidity provision.
Keywords: Shadow banking; liquidity requirements; regulatory arbitrage; liquidity shortage; search and matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E40 E50 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07-03
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