The process towards centralisation of the European financial supervisory architecture: The case of the Banking UnionElisabetta Montanaro ()
PSL Quarterly Review, 2016, vol. 69, issue 277, 135-172 Abstract: The evolution of the EU supervisory architecture has demonstrated that it took the risk of a euro break-up to just barely overcome the political resistances to centralisation by Member States and their supervisors. In the two-tier Europe that is emerging after the euro crisis, the integrity of the single market seems today crucially interlinked with the success of the banking union and its attractiveness for non-euro countries. The banking union’s design, without a credible common fiscal backstop, remains however a partial solution to the financial stability issues arising from the fragmentation of the EU financial market in the event of banking crises. The analysis performed on non-euro countries’ assessments of the pros and cons of joining the banking union aims to show that until fiscal responsibility for financial stability remains at the national level, regulatory centralisation cannot sever the traditional divide between home and host supervisors. Keywords: EU financial supervision; banking union; non-euro countries; CEE countries; cross-border banking (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:psl:pslqrr:2016:22 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article PSL Quarterly Review is currently edited by Alessandro Roncaglia and Carlo D'Ippoliti More articles in PSL Quarterly Review from Economia civile |
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