The Optimal Regulation of Product Quality under Monopoly

Hans Zenger ()
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Hans Zenger: University of Munich

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 12, issue 13, 1-4

Abstract: This paper characterizes the optimal quality regulation of a monopolist when quality is observable. In contrast to Sheshinski (1976) it is shown that a minimum quality standard may be desirable even if it induces the firm to reduce output.

Keywords: Monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12-13
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