Reciprocal strategies and aspiration levels in a Cournot-Stackelberg experiment

Economics Bulletin, 2002, vol. 3, issue 3, 1-7

Abstract: We examine behavior in Cournot and Stackelberg markets in a simple experiment where participants experience both market forms. Moreover, Stackelberg followers have to submit full response strategies. Our main finding is that Stackelberg followers employ rather flat, reciprocal response function, i.e., they punish leaders in who try to exploit their strategic adavantage and are willing to cooperate with cooperative leaders. Also, it turns out that prior exposure to a symmetric market makes followers more aggressive which hints at the role of aspiration levels in markets.

Keywords: aspiration; levels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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