Quels facteurs expliquent la faible coopération en horticulture ?

Serge Blondel and Ngoc-Thao Noet

Revue économique, 2023, vol. 74, issue 5, 861-888

Abstract: This article analyses the behavior of horticulturists when faced with the urgency of cooperating to carry out collective actions. Collective actions exist but are often the result of one-off operations. In a public good game, in an incentivized online survey, if actors are found to be altruistic and cooperative, a bias appears: they consider themselves more cooperative than others, when in fact they are not. This effect explains why collective actions are not sustained, and why the chain of reciprocity fails. Our study also reveals a typical profile of horticulturists who would engage in professional organizations: mobilizing them would allow collective actions to be applied and to last.

Keywords: better-than-average-effect; cooperation; field experiment; horticulture; public good game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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