Details about Masahiko Hattori
Access statistics for papers by Masahiko Hattori.
Last updated 2021-03-12. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pha988
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Working Papers
2018
- Minimax theorem and Nash equilibrium of symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (2)
- Minimax theorem and Nash equilibrium of symmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
2017
- Convexity, concavity, super-additivity, and sub-additivity of cost function without fixed cost
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
- License and entry decision for innovating firm in international duopoly under vertical differentiation
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- License and entry strategies for an outside innovator in duopoly with combination of royalty and fixed fee under vertical differentiation
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
- License and entry strategies for an outside innovator under duopoly with combination of royalty and fixed fee
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
See also Journal Article License and Entry Strategies for an Outside Innovator Under Duopoly with Combination of Royalty and Fixed Fee, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer (2018) View citations (1) (2018)
- License and entry strategies for outside innovator in duopoly
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (4)
- License fees in oligopoly when outside innovator can enter the market: two-step auction
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
See also Journal Article License Fees in Oligopoly When Outside Innovator can Enter the Market: Two-Step Auction, International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. (2020) (2020)
- License or entry decision for innovator in international duopoly with convex cost functions
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Negative royalty in duopoly and definition of license fee: general demand and cost functions
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
See also Journal Article Negative Royalty in Duopoly and Definition of License Fee: General Demand and Cost Functions, International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan (2018) View citations (1) (2018)
- On a strictly convex and strictly sub-additive cost function with positive fixed cost
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Robustness of subsidy in licensing under vertical differentiation: General distribution and cost functions
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Royalty and license fee under oligopoly with or without entry of innovator: Two-step auction
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Royalty and license fee under vertical differentiation in oligopoly with or without entry of innovator: Two-step auction
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Vertical differentiation in oligopoly and license fees when outside innovator can enter the market: Two-step auction
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2016
- Competitiveness and subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption in duopoly
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
See also Journal Article Competitiveness and Subsidy or Tax Policy for New Technology Adoption in Duopoly, Global Economic Review, Taylor & Francis Journals (2017) (2017)
- License or entry in oligopoly
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2016)
- License or entry with vertical differentiation in duopoly
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (13)
See also Journal Article License or entry with vertical differentiation in duopoly, Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press (2016) View citations (12) (2016)
- Subsidizing new technology adoption in a Stackelberg duopoly: Cases of substitutes and complements
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (9)
See also Journal Article Subsidizing New Technology Adoption in a Stackelberg Duopoly: Cases of Substitutes and Complements, Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer (2016) View citations (10) (2016)
- Taxation or subsidization policy for new technology adoption in oligopoly
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Taxation or Subsidization Policy for New Technology Adoption in Oligopoly, International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan (2016) View citations (1) (2016)
2015
- Subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption in duopoly with quadratic and linear cost functions
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (21)
See also Journal Article Subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption in duopoly with quadratic and linear cost functions, Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon (2015) View citations (21) (2015)
2014
- Incentive for adoption of new technology in duopoly under absolute and relative profit maximization
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (19)
See also Journal Article Incentive for adoption of new technology in duopoly under absolute and relative profit maximization, Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon (2014) View citations (17) (2014)
Journal Articles
2020
- Entry of Innovator and License in Oligopoly
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2020, 20, (4), 709-731
- License Fees in Oligopoly When Outside Innovator can Enter the Market: Two-Step Auction
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2020, 22, (03), 1-15
See also Working Paper License fees in oligopoly when outside innovator can enter the market: two-step auction, MPRA Paper (2017) (2017)
2019
- General analysis of dynamic oligopoly with sticky price
Economics Bulletin, 2019, 39, (4), 2990-2998 View citations (1)
2018
- A game of subsidization or taxation for new technology adoption in international duopoly
Philippine Review of Economics, 2018, 55, (1 and 2), 110-127
- License and Entry Decisions for a Firm with a Cost Advantage in an International Duopoly under Convex Cost Functions
Journal of Economics and Management, 2018, 14, (1), 1-31
- License and Entry Strategies for an Outside Innovator Under Duopoly
Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, 2018, 4, (1), 135-152 View citations (3)
- License and Entry Strategies for an Outside Innovator Under Duopoly with Combination of Royalty and Fixed Fee
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2018, 18, (4), 485-502 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper License and entry strategies for an outside innovator under duopoly with combination of royalty and fixed fee, MPRA Paper (2017) View citations (1) (2017)
- Negative Royalty in Duopoly and Definition of License Fee: General Demand and Cost Functions
International Journal of Business and Economics, 2018, 17, (2), 163-178 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper Negative royalty in duopoly and definition of license fee: general demand and cost functions, MPRA Paper (2017) (2017)
- Vertical differentiation in oligopoly and license fees when outside innovator can enter the market: Two†step auction
Metroeconomica, 2018, 69, (2), 347-365 View citations (1)
2017
- Competitiveness and Subsidy or Tax Policy for New Technology Adoption in Duopoly
Global Economic Review, 2017, 46, (1), 18-32
See also Working Paper Competitiveness and subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption in duopoly, MPRA Paper (2016) (2016)
- Competitiveness of Firm Behavior and Public Policy for New Technology Adoption in an Oligopoly
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2017, 17, (2), 135-151 View citations (3)
- License or Entry in Duopoly with Quality Improving Innovation: Alternative Definitions of License Fee
Journal of Economics and Management, 2017, 13, (1), 1-26 View citations (1)
2016
- License or entry with vertical differentiation in duopoly
Economics and Business Letters, 2016, 5, (1), 17-29 View citations (12)
See also Working Paper License or entry with vertical differentiation in duopoly, MPRA Paper (2016) View citations (13) (2016)
- Subsidizing New Technology Adoption in a Stackelberg Duopoly: Cases of Substitutes and Complements
Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, 2016, 2, (2), 197-215 View citations (10)
See also Working Paper Subsidizing new technology adoption in a Stackelberg duopoly: Cases of substitutes and complements, MPRA Paper (2016) View citations (9) (2016)
- Subsidy for New Technology Adoption in Duopoly with Differentiated Goods under Absolute and Relative Profit Maximization
Journal of Economics Library, 2016, 3, (3), 411-428 View citations (4)
- Taxation or Subsidization Policy for New Technology Adoption in Oligopoly
International Journal of Business and Economics, 2016, 15, (2), 161-172 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper Taxation or subsidization policy for new technology adoption in oligopoly, MPRA Paper (2016) View citations (1) (2016)
2015
- Subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption in duopoly with quadratic and linear cost functions
Economics Bulletin, 2015, 35, (2), 1423-1433 View citations (21)
See also Working Paper Subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption in duopoly with quadratic and linear cost functions, MPRA Paper (2015) View citations (21) (2015)
2014
- Incentive for adoption of new technology in duopoly under absolute and relative profit maximization
Economics Bulletin, 2014, 34, (3), 2051-2059 View citations (17)
See also Working Paper Incentive for adoption of new technology in duopoly under absolute and relative profit maximization, MPRA Paper (2014) View citations (19) (2014)
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