Details about Ichiro Obara

Access statistics for papers by Ichiro Obara.

Last updated 2024-11-06. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pob3

Working Papers

2024

1. Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games
   Papers, arXiv.org
2. Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication
   Papers, arXiv.org
   Also in PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania (2023)
3. Weighted Garbling
   Papers, arXiv.org

2015

4. Repeated Games with General Discounting
   Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article Repeated games with general discounting, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2017) View citations (8) (2017)

2011

5. Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

2008

6. Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration
   Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations (7)
   Also in Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2006) View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article Firm reputation and horizontal integration, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2009) View citations (18) (2009)
7. Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships
   Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations (2)
   Also in Working Papers, University of Minnesota, Department of Economics (2008) View citations (1)
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2007)

2007

8. Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games
   2007 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics View citations (5)
9. Folk Theorem with Communication
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations (1)
   Also in UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics (2005) View citations (10)
   See also Journal Article Folk theorem with communication, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2009) View citations (49) (2009)
10. The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations (1)
    Also in UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations (4)
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2006) View citations (9)
    See also Journal Article The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter (2008) View citations (25) (2008)

2006

11. Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics
12. Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations (5)
    Also in CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo (2003) View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games, International Journal of Game Theory, Springer (2006) View citations (5) (2006)

2005

13. Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games
    PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania View citations (11)
    Also in Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2005) View citations (11)
14. Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations (1)

2004

15. Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics
    Also in CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo (2003) View citations (14)
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics (2003) View citations (13)
    See also Journal Article Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies, Econometrica, Econometric Society (2006) View citations (57) (2006)
16. Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations (1)
17. Endogeous Monitoring
    2004 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics View citations (6)
    Also in UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations (6)
18. Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations (2)

2003

19. Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations (1)

2000

20. Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring
    Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society View citations (11)
    Also in Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department View citations (6)
    See also Journal Article Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2002) View citations (75) (2002)
21. Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited
    Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society View citations (13)

Undated

22. Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
23. Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman)
    UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
24. The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
    Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department
    See also Journal Article The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2002) View citations (18) (2002)
25. The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case
    Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department
    Also in CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences View citations (2)

Journal Articles

2017

1. Collusion and heterogeneity of firms
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2017, 48, (1), 230-249 View citations (7)
2. Mechanism design with information acquisition
   Economic Theory, 2017, 63, (3), 783-812 View citations (2)
3. Repeated games with general discounting
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 172, (C), 348-375 View citations (8)
   See also Working Paper Repeated Games with General Discounting, Working papers (2015) View citations (1) (2015)

2014

4. Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, 153, (C), 191-212

2010

5. Mediated Partnerships
   Econometrica, 2010, 78, (1), 285-308 View citations (19)

2009

6. Firm reputation and horizontal integration
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2009, 40, (2), 340-363 View citations (18)
   See also Working Paper Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration, Levine's Working Paper Archive (2008) View citations (7) (2008)
7. Folk theorem with communication
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, (1), 120-134 View citations (49)
   See also Working Paper Folk Theorem with Communication, Levine's Bibliography (2007) View citations (1) (2007)

2008

8. The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
   The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2008, 8, (1), 28 View citations (25)
   See also Working Paper The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions, Levine's Bibliography (2007) View citations (1) (2007)

2006

9. Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
   Econometrica, 2006, 74, (2), 499-519 View citations (57)
   See also Working Paper Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies, Levine's Bibliography (2004) (2004)
10. Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, 34, (4), 475-493 View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games, Levine's Bibliography (2006) View citations (5) (2006)

2002

11. Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 102, (1), 40-69 View citations (75)
    See also Working Paper Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers (2000) View citations (11) (2000)
12. The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40, (1), 99-122 View citations (18)
    See also Working Paper The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Penn CARESS Working Papers