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9th WINE 2013: Cambridge, MA, USA
- Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica:
Web and Internet Economics - 9th International Conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8289, Springer 2013, ISBN 978-3-642-45045-7 - Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem. 1-14 - Yogesh Anbalagan, Sergey Norin, Rahul Savani
, Adrian Vetta:
Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3. 15-23 - Haris Aziz
The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship. 24-25 - Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Milan Vojnovic:
Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments. 26-39 - MohammadHossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan, Morteza Zadimoghaddam:
Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods. 40-53 - Vittorio Bilò
On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games. 54-67 - Rainer Böhme, Jens Grossklags:
Trading Agent Kills Market Information - Evidence from Online Social Lending. 68-81 - Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner:
Designing Markets for Daily Deals. 82-95 - Vincent Conitzer:
The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. 96-108 - José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier Moses
The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited. 109-120 - Nishanth Dikkala, Éva Tardos:
Can Credit Increase Revenue? 121-133 - Christoph Dürr, Lukasz Jez, Óscar C. Vásquez
Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduling. 134-145 - Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger:
Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions. 146-159 - Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions. 160-173 - Moran Feldman
Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare? 174-187 - Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas, Paul G. Spirakis:
Resolving Braess's Paradox in Random Networks. 188-201 - Dimitris Fotakis, Emmanouil Zampetakis:
Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design. 202-215 - Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Lydia Tlilane:
A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes. 216-229 - Tobias Harks, Philipp von Falkenhausen:
Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox. 230-231 - Xinran He, David Kempe:
Price of Anarchy for the N-Player Competitive Cascade Game with Submodular Activation Functions. 232-248 - Martin Hoefer, Lisa Wagner:
Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation Games. 249-262 - Moshe Hoffman, Daniel Moeller, Ramamohan Paturi:
Jealousy Graphs: Structure and Complexity of Decentralized Stable Matching. 263-276 - Stratis Ioannidis
Linear Regression as a Non-cooperative Game. 277-290 - Weihao Kong, Jian Li, Tie-Yan Liu, Tao Qin:
Optimal Allocation for Chunked-Reward Advertising. 291-304 - Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Morteza Zadimoghaddam:
Bicriteria Online Matching: Maximizing Weight and Cardinality. 305-318 - Aron Laszka
Mitigating Covert Compromises - A Game-Theoretic Model of Targeted and Non-Targeted Covert Attacks. 319-332 - Pinyan Lu
Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments. 333-346 - Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects. 347-360 - Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni:
Exchange Markets: Strategy Meets Supply-Awareness - (Abstract). 361-362 - Frédéric Meunier, Thomas Pradeau:
A Lemke-Like Algorithm for the Multiclass Network Equilibrium Problem. 363-376 - Hadi Minooei, Chaitanya Swamy:
Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players. 377-390 - Mona Rahn, Guido Schäfer:
Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism through Social Contribution Games. 391-404 - Nick Arnosti, Daniel Russo:
Welfare-Improving Cascades and the Effect of Noisy Reviews. 405-420 - Daniela Sabán, Jay Sethuraman:
The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix. 421 - Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions. 422-435 - Yuan Tian:
Strategy-Proof and Efficient Offline Interval Scheduling and Cake Cutting. 436-437
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