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8th WINE 2012: Liverpool, UK
- Paul W. Goldberg:
Internet and Network Economics - 8th International Workshop, WINE 2012, Liverpool, UK, December 10-12, 2012. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7695, Springer 2012, ISBN 978-3-642-35310-9
Regular Papers
- Vasileios Tzoumas
, Christos Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis:
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of a Competitive Diffusion Process over Social Networks. 1-14 - Yoram Bachrach, Ian A. Kash, Nisarg Shah:
Agent Failures in Totally Balanced Games and Convex Games. 15-29 - Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Mitzenmacher, Georgios Zervas:
An Economic Analysis of User-Privacy Options in Ad-Supported Services. 30-43 - Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger:
Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits. 44-57 - Samantha Leung, Edward Lui:
Bayesian Mechanism Design with Efficiency, Privacy, and Approximate Truthfulness. 58-71 - Davide Bilò
Bounded-Distance Network Creation Games. 72-85 - Nikolay Archak, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan:
Budget Optimization for Online Campaigns with Positive Carryover Effects. 86-99 - Sunil Simon, Krzysztof R. Apt:
Choosing Products in Social Networks. 100-113 - Morteza Zadimoghaddam, Aaron Roth
Efficiently Learning from Revealed Preference. 114-127 - Amotz Bar-Noy, Yi Gai, Matthew P. Johnson, Bhaskar Krishnamachari, George Rabanca:
Funding Games: The Truth but Not the Whole Truth. 128-141 - Pascal Lenzner:
Greedy Selfish Network Creation. 142-155 - Andreas Darmann, Edith Elkind, Sascha Kurz, Jérôme Lang, Joachim Schauer
Group Activity Selection Problem. 156-169 - Avishay Maya, Noam Nisan:
Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting. 170-183 - Georgios Piliouras, Tomás Valla
LP-Based Covering Games with Low Price of Anarchy. 184-197 - Anand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna:
Mechanism Design for a Risk Averse Seller. 198-211 - Swaprava Nath
Mechanism Design for Time Critical and Cost Critical Task Execution via Crowdsourcing. 212-226 - Bundit Laekhanukit
Non-redistributive Second Welfare Theorems. 227-243 - Nicole Immorlica, Emmanouil Pountourakis:
On Budget-Balanced Group-Strategyproof Cost-Sharing Mechanisms. 244-255 - Dvir Falik, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Coalitions and Stable Winners in Plurality. 256-269 - Dimitris Fotakis
On the Efficiency of Influence-and-Exploit Strategies for Revenue Maximization under Positive Externalities. 270-283 - Volodymyr Kuleshov, Gordon T. Wilfong:
On the Efficiency of the Simplest Pricing Mechanisms in Two-Sided Markets. 284-297 - Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos
Optimal Pricing Is Hard. 298-308 - Pranav Dandekar, Nadia Fawaz
Privacy Auctions for Recommender Systems. 309-322 - Victor Naroditskiy, Mingyu Guo, Lachlan Dufton, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings
Redistribution of VCG Payments in Public Project Problems. 323-336 - Kshipra Bhawalkar, Tim Roughgarden:
Simultaneous Single-Item Auctions. 337-349 - Johanne Cohen, Christoph Dürr, Kim Thang Nguyen:
Smooth Inequalities and Equilibrium Inefficiency in Scheduling Games. 350-363 - Martin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik:
Social Context in Potential Games. 364-377 - Katrina Ligett
Take It or Leave It: Running a Survey When Privacy Comes at a Cost. 378-391 - Davide Bilò
The Max-Distance Network Creation Game on General Host Graphs. 392-405 - Christian Borgs
The Power of Local Information in Social Networks. 406-419 - Xujin Chen, Benjamin Doerr, Xiaodong Hu, Weidong Ma, Rob van Stee, Carola Winzen:
The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing Is Two. 420-433 - Ashish Goel, David Lee:
Triadic Consensus - A Randomized Algorithm for Voting in a Crowd. 434-447 - Hadi Minooei, Chaitanya Swamy:
Truthful Mechanism Design for Multidimensional Covering Problems. 448-461 - Hamed Amini, Nikolaos Fountoulakis
What I Tell You Three Times Is True: Bootstrap Percolation in Small Worlds. 462-474
Short Papers
- Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi:
Ad Allocation for Browse Sessions. 475-481 - Sayan Bhattacharya, Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing a Profit-Maximizing Sequence of Offers to Agents in a Social Network. 482-488 - Lei Yao, Wei Chen, Tie-Yan Liu:
Convergence Analysis for Weighted Joint Strategy Fictitious Play in Generalized Second Price Auction. 489-495 - Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics in Games with Conflicting Congestion Effects. 496-503 - Swapnil Dhamal
Forming Networks of Strategic Agents with Desired Topologies. 504-511 - Bassel Tarbush, Alexander Teytelboym:
Homophily in Online Social Networks. 512-518 - Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis:
Limited Supply Online Auctions for Revenue Maximization. 519-525 - Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Omer Tamuz
Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions. 526-531 - Vahab S. Mirrokni, Sebastien Roch, Mukund Sundararajan:
On Fixed-Price Marketing for Goods with Positive Network Externalities. 532-538 - Daniela Sabán, Nicolás Stier Moses
The Competitive Facility Location Problem in a Duopoly: Connections to the 1-Median Problem. 539-545 - Angelo Fanelli
The Ring Design Game with Fair Cost Allocation - [Extended Abstract]. 546-552 - Amos Fiat, Ariel Levavi:
Tight Lower Bounds on Envy-Free Makespan Approximation. 553-558
Working Papers
- Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, David Lee:
Biased Assimilation, Homophily, and the Dynamics of Polarization - (Working Paper). 559 - Lirong Xia:
Generalized Weighted Model Counting: An Efficient Monte-Carlo meta-algorithm (Working Paper). 560 - Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan:
The AND-OR Game: Equilibrium Characterization - (Working Paper). 561
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