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Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 34
Volume 34, Number 1, January 2010
- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Miguel A. Ballester:
On ranking opportunity distributions. 3-31 - Werner Kirsch, Jessica Langner:
Power indices and minimal winning coalitions. 33-46 - Roland Iwan Luttens:
Minimal rights based solidarity. 47-64 - Patrick Hummel:
Jury theorems with multiple alternatives. 65-103 - Abraham Diskin, Moshe Koppel:
Voting power: an information theory approach. 105-119 - Donald G. Saari, Garrett R. Asay:
Finessing a point: augmenting the core. 121-143 - Carmen Herrero, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Giovanni Ponti:
On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study. 145-179
Volume 34, Number 2, February 2010
- Nicolas Houy:
A characterization of prudent choices. 181-192 - Hervé Moulin:
Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms. 193-216 - Donald G. Saari:
Systematic analysis of multiple voting rules. 217-247 - Magnus Hoffmann:
Enforcement of property rights in a barter economy. 249-263 - Michael Peress:
The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates. 265-294 - Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, Vito Fragnelli:
Two-sided market situations with existing contracts. 295-313 - Claus Beisbart, Stephan Hartmann:
Welfarist evaluations of decision rules under interstate utility dependencies. 315-344 - Tsung-Sheng Tsai, C. C. Yang:
Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty. 345-361
Volume 34, Number 3, March 2010
- Diego Martínez, A. Jesus Sanchez:
A note on the optimal level of public inputs. 363-369 - Noga Alon, Paul H. Edelman:
The inverse Banzhaf problem. 371-377 - Bertrand Tchantcho, Lawrence Diffo Lambo, Roland Pongou, Joël Moulen:
On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval. 379-396 - Dwight R. Bean, Jane Friedman, Cameron Parker:
Proportional quota weighted voting system hierarchies. 397-410 - Conal Duddy, Juan Perote-Peña, Ashley Piggins:
Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences. 411-428 - Maria Axenovich, Sonali Roy:
On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games. 429-440 - Sunghoon Hong, Youngsub Chun:
Efficiency and stability in a model of wireless communication networks. 441-454 - Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Hiroki Saitoh:
Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism. 455-470 - Rafael Hortala-Vallve:
Inefficiencies on linking decisions. 471-486 - José Luis García-Lapresta, A. A. J. Marley, Miguel Martínez-Panero:
Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context. 487-496 - Alex Voorhoeve:
Hugh LaFollette: The Practice of Ethics - Blackwell, viii, 300 p. ISBN: 0-631-21945-5. 497-501 - Norman Schofield:
Social orders. 503-536
Volume 34, Number 4, April 2010
- Kirsten I. M. Rohde:
A preference foundation for Fehr and Schmidt's model of inequity aversion. 537-547 - Mitsunobu Miyake:
Convergence theorems of willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for nonmarket goods. 549-570 - Biung-Ghi Ju:
Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach. 571-596 - Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, Maximilian Mair:
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. 597-609 - Susumu Cato, Daisuke Hirata:
Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations. 611-630 - Jean-François Bonnefon:
Behavioral evidence for framing effects in the resolution of the doctrinal paradox. 631-641 - Sanne Zwart:
Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right. 643-677 - Yan-An Hwang, Yu-Hsien Liao:
Consistency and dynamic approach of indexes. 679-694 - Gustavo Bergantiños, Leticia Lorenzo, Silvia Lorenzo-Freire:
The family of cost monotonic and cost additive rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems. 695-710
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