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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Volume 3
Volume 3, Number 1, March 2015
- Kevin Leyton-Brown, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis:
Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'12. 1:1-1:2 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin, Alexander Skopalik:
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure. 2:1-2:32 - David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah:
Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness: Extensions, Limitations, and Indivisibilities. 3:1-3:22 - Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply. 4:1-4:26 - Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes:
Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers. 5:1-5:41 - Tim Roughgarden:
The Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information. 6:1-6:20
Volume 3, Number 2, April 2015
- Daniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri:
Improving the Effectiveness of Time-Based Display Advertising. 7:1-7:20 - Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Safe Opponent Exploitation. 8:1-8:28 - Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim:
Secondary Spectrum Auctions for Symmetric and Submodular Bidders. 9:1-9:25 - Christopher A. Wilkens, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Single-Call Mechanisms. 10:1-10:60 - Deepayan Chakrabarti, Erik Vee:
Traffic Shaping to Optimize Ad Delivery. 11:1-11:20 - Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, R. Preston McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
To Match or Not to Match: Economics of Cookie Matching in Online Advertising. 12:1-12:18
Volume 3, Number 3, June 2015
- Ian A. Kash, Eric J. Friedman, Joseph Y. Halpern:
An Equilibrium Analysis of Scrip Systems. 13:1-13:32 - Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian:
Incentives in Large Random Two-Sided Markets. 14:1-14:25 - Ruggiero Cavallo, R. Preston McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Display Advertising Auctions with Arbitrage. 15:1-15:23 - Davide Bilò, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti:
Bounded-Distance Network Creation Games. 16:1-16:20
Volume 3, Number 4, July 2015
- Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica:
Introduction to the Special Issue on WINE'13. 17:1 - MohammadHossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan, Morteza Zadimoghaddam:
Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods. 18:1-18:16 - Hadi Minooei, Chaitanya Swamy:
Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players. 19:1-19:24 - Dimitris Fotakis, Emmanouil Zampetakis:
Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design. 20:1-20:29
- Konstantinos Kollias, Tim Roughgarden:
Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games. 21:1-21:24 - Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman:
Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium. 22:1-22:9 - Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb:
The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces. 23:1-23:16 - Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami, Marina A. Epelman:
Subsidized Prediction Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Agents. 24:1-24:23 - Yuanzhang Xiao, Mihaela van der Schaar:
Socially-Optimal Design of Service Exchange Platforms with Imperfect Monitoring. 25:1-25:25 - Swaprava Nath, Arunava Sen:
Affine Maximizers in Domains with Selfish Valuations. 26:1-26:19
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