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8th ACM-EC 2007: San Diego, California, USA
- Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, David C. Parkes, Paul Resnick:
Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), San Diego, California, USA, June 11-15, 2007. ACM 2007, ISBN 978-1-59593-653-0
First to market
- Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Beyond moulin mechanisms. 1-10 - Thành Nguyen, Éva Tardos:
Approximately maximizing efficiency and revenue in polyhedral environments. 11-19 - Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov:
Generalized trade reduction mechanisms. 20-29 - Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments. 30-39
The price is right
- Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál, Clifford Stein:
Budget optimization in search-based advertising auctions. 40-49 - Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock:
Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions. 50-56 - Juan Feng, Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang:
Dynamic price competition on the internet: advertising auctions. 57-58 - Garud Iyengar, Anuj Kumar:
An equilibrium model for matching impatient demand and patient supply over time. 59-65
Pass It On
- Esteban Arcaute, Adam Kirsch, Ravi Kumar, David Liben-Nowell, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
On threshold behavior in query incentive networks. 66-74 - Nicole Immorlica, Jon M. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, Tom Wexler:
The role of compatibility in the diffusion of technologies through social networks. 75-83 - Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour:
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. 84-92 - Yogeshwer Sharma, David P. Williamson:
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism. 93-102 - Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Congestion games with malicious players. 103-112
Empirical excursions
- Kan Takeuchi, John Lin, Yan Chen, Thomas A. Finholt:
Shake it up baby: scheduling with package auctions. 113 - James Reilly, Jiyong Zhang, Lorraine McGinty, Pearl Pu, Barry Smyth:
Evaluating compound critiquing recommenders: a real-user study. 114-123 - Stephan Schosser, Klemens Böhm, Bodo Vogt:
Indirect partner interaction in peer-to-peer networks: stimulating cooperation by means of structure. 124-133 - Arjun Talwar, Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings:
Understanding user behavior in online feedback reporting. 134-142
A complex collection
- Larry Blume, David A. Easley, Jon M. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos:
Trading networks with price-setting agents. 143-151 - Georg Gottlob, Gianluigi Greco:
On the complexity of combinatorial auctions: structured item graphs and hypertree decomposition. 152-161 - Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg:
Computing good nash equilibria in graphical games. 162-171 - Daniel Golovin:
Stochastic packing-market planning. 172-181
Recommended for people like you
- Christopher Scaffidi, Kevin Bierhoff, Eric Chang, Mikhael Felker, Herman Ng, Chun Jin:
Red Opal: product-feature scoring from reviews. 182-191 - Daniel M. Fleder, Kartik Hosanagar:
Recommender systems and their impact on sales diversity. 192-199 - Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings:
Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments. 200-209 - Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources. 210-217
The price is optimal
- David Kempe, Adam Meyerson, Nainesh Solanki, Ramnath K. Chellappa:
Pricing of partially compatible products. 218-226 - Yagil Engel, Michael P. Wellman:
Generalized value decomposition and structured multiattribute auctions. 227-236 - John O. Ledyard:
Optimal combinatoric auctions with single-minded bidders. 237-242 - Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg:
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations. 243-251 - Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy:
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. 252-261
Searching for sponsors
- Matthew Cary, Aparna Das, Benjamin Edelman, Ioannis Giotis, Kurtis Heimerl, Anna R. Karlin, Claire Mathieu, Michael Schwarz:
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions. 262-271 - Zoë Abrams, Ofer Mendelevitch, John A. Tomlin:
Optimal delivery of sponsored search advertisements subject to budget constraints. 272-278 - Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediators in position auctions. 279-287 - Mohammad Mahdian, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi:
Allocating online advertisement space with unreliable estimates. 288-294
Not for sale
- David J. Abraham, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm:
Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges. 295-304 - Ian A. Kash, Eric J. Friedman, Joseph Y. Halpern:
Optimizing scrip systems: efficiency, crashes, hoarders, and altruists. 305-315 - Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami:
A strategic model for information markets. 316-325 - Yiling Chen, Lance Fortnow, Evdokia Nikolova, David M. Pennock:
Betting on permutations. 326-335
Last but not least
- Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg:
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover. 336-345 - Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. 346-351 - Tomás Feder, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi:
Approximating nash equilibria using small-support strategies. 352-354 - Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Progress in approximate nash equilibria. 355-358
Workshops
- Daniel Grosu, Ratul Mahajan, Rahul Sami:
Joint workshop on the economics of networked systems and incentive-based computing. 359-360 - Yiling Chen, John O. Ledyard, David M. Pennock, Eric Zitzewitz:
Second workshop on prediction markets. 361-362 - Mehmet Sayal, Martin Hepp:
EC 2007 workshop outline -- DEECS 2007: the 3rd international workshop on data engineering issues in e-commerce and services. 363-364
Tutorials
- Yiling Chen:
Prediction markets: economics, computation, and mechanism design. 365 - Neel Sundaresan:
Online trust and reputation systems. 366-367 - Foster J. Provost, Arun Sundararajan:
Modeling complex networks for electronic commerce. 368 - Kartik Hosanagar, Michael Schwarz:
Tutorial on sponsored search. 369
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