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6th SAGT 2013: Aachen, Germany
- Berthold Vöcking:
Algorithmic Game Theory - 6th International Symposium, SAGT 2013, Aachen, Germany, October 21-23, 2013. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8146, Springer 2013, ISBN 978-3-642-41391-9
Voting
- Piotr Skowron, Lan Yu, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Elkind:
The Complexity of Fully Proportional Representation for Single-Crossing Electorates. 1-12 - Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet, Maria Polukarov:
New Results on Equilibria in Strategic Candidacy. 13-25 - Svetlana Obraztsova, Evangelos Markakis, David R. M. Thompson:
Plurality Voting with Truth-Biased Agents. 26-37 - Yoram Bachrach, Nisarg Shah:
Reliability Weighted Voting Games. 38-49
Price of Anarchy
- Dieter Mitsche, George Saad, Jared Saia:
The Power of Mediation in an Extended El Farol Game. 50-61 - Elliot Anshelevich, Onkar Bhardwaj, Michael Usher:
Friend of My Friend: Network Formation with Two-Hop Benefit. 62-73 - Sofia Belikovetsky, Tami Tamir:
Load Rebalancing Games in Dynamic Systems with Migration Costs. 74-85
Congestion Games
- Haris Angelidakis, Dimitris Fotakis, Thanasis Lianeas:
Stochastic Congestion Games with Risk-Averse Players. 86-97 - Martin Gairing, Max Klimm:
Congestion Games with Player-Specific Costs Revisited. 98-109 - Kun Hu, Jingjing Huang, George Karakostas:
Using Reputation Instead of Tolls in Repeated Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information. 110-121
Computational Aspects
- Jeremy Kun, Brian Powers, Lev Reyzin:
Anti-coordination Games and Stable Graph Colorings. 122-133 - Kord Eickmeyer, Ken-ichi Kawarabayashi:
Approximating Multi Commodity Network Design on Graphs of Bounded Pathwidth and Bounded Degree. 134-145
Alternative Solution Concepts
- Valerio Capraro, Matteo Venanzi, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings:
Cooperative Equilibria in Iterated Social Dilemmas. 146-158 - Ales Antonin Kubena, Peter Franek:
Symmetries of Quasi-Values. 159-170 - Sandy Heydrich, Rob van Stee:
Dividing Connected Chores Fairly. 171-182 - Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Paul Stursberg:
On Popular Random Assignments. 183-194
Social Networks
- MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, Anshul Sawant:
Scheduling a Cascade with Opposing Influences. 195-206 - Bruno Escoffier, Diodato Ferraioli, Laurent Gourvès, Stefano Moretti:
Designing Budget-Balanced Best-Response Mechanisms for Network Coordination Games. 207-218 - Aris Anagnostopoulos, Luca Becchetti, Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer:
Inefficiency of Games with Social Context. 219-230
Mechanism Design
- Xujin Chen, Donglei Du, Luis Fernando Zuluaga:
Copula-Based Randomized Mechanisms for Truthful Scheduling on Two Unrelated Machines. 231-242 - Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna:
Imperfect Best-Response Mechanisms. 243-254 - Xiaotie Deng, Paul W. Goldberg, Yang Sun, Bo Tang, Jinshan Zhang:
Pricing Ad Slots with Consecutive Multi-unit Demand. 255-266
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