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Optimal Pollution Standards and Non-Compliance in a Dynamic Framework. (2014). Martin-Herran, Guiomar ; Arguedas, Carmen ; Cabo, Francisco.
In: Working Papers in Economic Theory.
RePEc:uam:wpaper:201408.

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  1. The Strategic Use of Abatement by a Polluting Monopoly. (2016). Rubio, Santiago ; Martin-Herran, Guiomar.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2016.58.

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  2. The Strategic Use of Abatement by a Polluting Monopoly. (2016). Martin-Herran, Guiomar ; Rubio, Santiago J.
    In: Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers.
    RePEc:ags:feemet:244532.

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  3. Minimum Quality Standards and Non-Compliance. (2015). Voßwinkel, Jan ; Birg, Laura ; Vosswinkel, Jan.
    In: Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112883.

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References

References cited by this document

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