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The option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules. (2012). Polborn, Mattias K ; Messner, Matthias.
In: Journal of Public Economics.
RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:96:y:2012:i:5:p:524-540.

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Cited: 23

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Cites: 22

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  1. Supermajority politics: Equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise. (2023). Tondji, Jean-Baptiste ; Pongou, Roland ; Mahajan, Aseem.
    In: European Journal of Operational Research.
    RePEc:eee:ejores:v:307:y:2023:i:2:p:963-974.

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  2. Collective Learning and Distributive Uncertainty. (2022). Ginzburg, Boris.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:112780.

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  3. Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations. (2021). Faravelli, Marco ; Man, Priscilla.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01285-x.

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  4. Cloturing Deliberation. (2021). Safronov, Mikhail ; Anesi, Vincent.
    In: DEM Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:luc:wpaper:21-03.

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  5. Brexit: Brinkmanship and Compromise. (2021). Nuñez, Matias ; Macé, Antonin ; Herrera, Helios ; Nunez, Matias.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03225030.

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  6. Brexit: Brinkmanship and Compromise. (2021). Nuñez, Matias ; Macé, Antonin ; Herrera, Helios ; Nunez, Matias.
    In: PSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-03225030.

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  7. Brexit: A comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options. (2021). Rosar, Frank ; Moldovanu, Benny.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:85-108.

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  8. Collective experimentation: A laboratory study. (2020). Martinelli, Cesar ; Wang, Siyu ; Freer, Mikhail.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:175:y:2020:i:c:p:365-379.

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  9. When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning. (2019). Guerra, José ; Ginzburg, Boris .
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:169:y:2019:i:c:p:52-64.

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  10. Brexit: Dynamic Voting with an Irreversible Option. (2019). Rosar, Frank ; Moldovanu, Benny.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14101.

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  11. Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules. (2018). Bowen, T. Renee ; Anesi, Vincent.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:not:notcdx:2018-09.

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  12. Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules. (2018). Bowen, T. Renee ; Anesi, Vincent.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25033.

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  13. Collective Experimentation: A Laboratory Study. (2018). Martinelli, Cesar ; Freer, Mikhail ; Wang, Siyu.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gms:wpaper:1066.

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  14. Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules. (2018). Anesi, Vincent ; Bowen, Renee T.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12797.

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  15. Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism. (2017). Proost, Stef ; Glazer, Amihai.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1043-y.

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  16. Committee Search with Ex-ante Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence. (2017). Kawata, Keisuke ; Inukai, Keigo ; Sasaki, Masaru.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10760.

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  17. When Ignorance is Bliss: Theory and Experiment on Collective Learning. (2017). Guerra, José ; Ginzburg, Boris.
    In: Documentos CEDE.
    RePEc:col:000089:015377.

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  18. Voting Rules in Bankruptcy Law. (2017). Nicolae, Stef .
    In: Review of Law & Economics.
    RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:13:y:2017:i:1:p:39:n:2.

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  19. Expert advice to a voting body. (2015). Schnakenberg, Keith E.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:160:y:2015:i:c:p:102-113.

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  20. Learning aversion and voting rules in collective decision making. (2015). Louis, Philippos.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:133:y:2015:i:c:p:24-26.

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  21. Deliberating Collective Decisions. (2015). Suen, Wing ; Lizzeri, Alessandro ; Yariv, Leeat ; Chan, Jimmy.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10466.

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  22. Persuading voters. (2014). Câmara, Odilon ; Camara, Odilon ; Alonso, Ricardo.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:58674.

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  23. The Roman Metro Problem: Dynamic Voting and the Limited Power of Commitment. (2013). Strulovici, Bruno ; Shelegia, Sandro ; Roessler, Christian.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1560.

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  11. Special Section: Experiments on Learning, Methods, and Voting. (2014). Passarelli, Francesco ; Georgantzís, Nikolaos ; Corazzini, Luca ; Attanasi, Giuseppe ; CharlesN. Noussair, ; Shachat, Jason.
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