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A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents. (2012). Rubinstein, Ariel ; Glazer, Jacob.
In: Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers.
RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275767.

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Cited: 17

Citations received by this document

Cites: 10

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Behavioral strong implementation. (2023). Korpela, Ville ; Hayashi, T ; Lombardi, M ; Jain, R.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:76:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-023-01494-0.

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  2. Behavioral implementation under incomplete information. (2023). Dalkiran, Nuh Aygun ; Barlo, Mehmet.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:213:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123001345.

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  3. Behavioral Causal Inference. (2023). Spiegler, Ran.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2305.18916.

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  4. Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade. (2022). Kneeland, Terri.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:201:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000114.

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  5. Behavioral Strong Implementation. (2021). Lombardi, Michele ; Korpela, Ville ; Hayashi, Takashi ; Jain, Ritesh.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp141.

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  6. When Competence Hurts: Revelation of Complex Information. (2021). Franaszek, Joanna.
    In: Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2021:i:3:p:5-23.

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  7. Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs. (2021). Thysen, Heidi C ; Spiegler, Ran ; Eliaz, Kfir.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:109842.

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  8. Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs. (2021). Spiegler, Ran ; Eliaz, Kfir ; Thysen, Heidi C.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:134:y:2021:i:c:s0014292121000659.

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  9. Behavioral Strong Implementation. (2020). Korpela, Ville ; Lombardi, M ; Jain, R ; Hayashi, T.
    In: IEAS Working Paper : academic research.
    RePEc:sin:wpaper:20-a002.

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  10. Rational attitude change by reference cues when information elaboration requires effort. (2018). Boncinelli, Leonardo ; Bilancini, Ennio.
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:65:y:2018:i:c:p:90-107.

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  11. Implementation via rights structures. (2018). Yildiz, Kemal ; Koray, Semih.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:479-502.

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  12. Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules. (2017). Kimya, Mert .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:138-146.

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  13. Persuasion: An experimental study of team decision making. (2016). Penczynski, Stefan P.
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:56:y:2016:i:c:p:244-261.

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  14. Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs. (2014). Boncinelli, Leonardo ; Bilancini, Ennio.
    In: Center for Economic Research (RECent).
    RePEc:mod:recent:102.

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  15. Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs. (2014). Boncinelli, Leonardo ; Bilancini, Ennio.
    In: Working Papers - Economics.
    RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2014_04.rdf.

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  16. Complex Questionnaires. (2014). Rubinstein, Ariel ; Glazer, Jacob.
    In: Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers.
    RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275824.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Cook, Stephen A. (1971). The Complexity of Theorem Proving Procedures. Proceedings Third Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 151-158.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  2. Eliaz, Kfir (2002). “Fault Tolerant Implementation”. Review of Economic Studies, 69, 589-610.

  3. Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein (1996). An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game. Journal of Economic Theory, 70, 32-42.

  4. Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein (1998). Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions. Journal of Economic Theory, 79, 157-173.

  5. Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein (2004). On Optimal Rules of Persuasion.

  6. Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein (2006). A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach. Theoretical Economics, 1, 395-410.

  7. Green, Jerry R. and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1986). Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design. The Review of Economic Studies, 53, 447-456.

  8. Kamien , Morton I. and Eitan Zemel (1990). Tangled Webs: A Note on the Complexity of Compound Lying. (mimeo) Page 28 5/16/2012
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  9. Kartik, Navin (2009). Strategic Communication with Lying Costs. Review of Economic Studies, 76, 1359-1395.

  10. Kartik, Navin, Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani (2007). Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk. Journal of Economic Theory, 134, 93-116.

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Empirical Equilibrium. (2019). Velez, Rodrigo ; Brown, Alexander.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:1804.07986.

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  2. Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade. (2017). Kneeland, Terri .
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2017303.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies. (2017). Yoshihara, Naoki ; Lombardi, Michele.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0568-8.

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  4. Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules. (2017). Kimya, Mert .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:138-146.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Mechanism Design and Intentions. (2016). Netzer, Nick ; Bierbrauer, Felix.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2016_04.

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  6. Mechanism design and intentions. (2016). Netzer, Nick ; Bierbrauer, Felix.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:163:y:2016:i:c:p:557-603.

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  7. An externality-robust auction: Theory and experimental evidence. (2016). Netzer, Nick ; Bartling, Bjorn.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:97:y:2016:i:c:p:186-204.

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  8. An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence. (2015). Netzer, Nick ; Bartling, Björn.
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:econwp:153.

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  9. Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal. (2015). Yoshihara, Naoki ; Lombardi, Michele.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2015-1.

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  10. Mechanism design and bounded rationality: The case of type misreporting. (2015). Rivas, Javier.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:78:y:2015:i:c:p:6-13.

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  11. Complexity and repeated implementation. (2015). Lee, Jihong ; Sabourian, Hamid .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:158:y:2015:i:pa:p:259-292.

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  12. Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals. (2015). Ortner, Juan.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:1-16.

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  13. Mechanism design and intentions. (2014). Netzer, Nick ; Bierbrauer, Felix.
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:econwp:066.

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  14. Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal. (2014). Yoshihara, Naoki ; Lombardi, Michele ; Naoki, Yoshihara .
    In: UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:ums:papers:2014-09.

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  15. Natural Implementation with Partially-honest Agents in Economic Environments with Free-disposal. (2014). Yoshihara, Naoki ; Lombardi, Michele.
    In: Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:hit:hituec:616.

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  16. An Externality-Robust Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence. (2014). Netzer, Nick ; Bartling, Björn.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4771.

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  17. Complex Questionnaires. (2014). Rubinstein, Ariel ; Glazer, Jacob.
    In: Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers.
    RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275824.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments. (2013). Yoshihara, Naoki ; Lombardi, Michele.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:48294.

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  19. Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents in Economic Environments. (2013). Yoshihara, Naoki ; Lombardi, Michele.
    In: Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:hit:hituec:592.

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  20. To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria. (2013). Tumennasan, Norovsambuu.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:77:y:2013:i:1:p:138-152.

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  21. Complex Questionnaires. (2013). Rubinstein, Ariel ; Glazer, Jacob.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000644.

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  22. National implementation with partially honest agents. (2012). Yoshihara, Naoki ; Lombardi, Michele ; Naoki, Yoshihara .
    In: Research Memorandum.
    RePEc:unm:umamet:2012005.

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  23. Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation. (2012). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
    RePEc:tky:fseres:2012cf870.

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  24. Mechanism Design and Intentions. (2012). Netzer, Nick ; Bierbrauer, Felix.
    In: Working Paper Series in Economics.
    RePEc:kls:series:0053.

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  25. Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation. (2012). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CARF F-Series.
    RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf301.

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  26. A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents. (2012). Rubinstein, Ariel ; Glazer, Jacob.
    In: Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers.
    RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275767.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent. (2012). Rubinstein, Ariel ; Glazer, Jacob.
    In: Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers.
    RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275764.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms. (2011). Serrano, Roberto ; Cabrales, Antonio.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:360-374.

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  29. A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent. (2011). Rubinstein, Ariel ; Glazer, Jacob.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000258.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. To Err is Human: Implementation in Quantal Response Equilibria. (2011). Tumennasan, Norovsambuu.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:aah:aarhec:2011-11.

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  31. Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals. (2010). Ortner, Juan.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:metric:wp009.pdf.

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  32. Congestion games with malicious players. (2009). Papadimitriou, Christos H. ; Kleinberg, Robert ; Babaioff, Moshe .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  33. The Maximal Domain for the Revelation Principle when Preferences are Menu Dependent. (2008). Saran, Rene.
    In: Research Memorandum.
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  34. Implementation and Social Influence. (2008). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
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  35. Committee decisions: Optimality and Equilibrium. (2008). Weibull, Jörgen ; Laslier, Jean-François.
    In: Working Papers.
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  36. Role of honesty in full implementation. (2008). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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  37. Behavioral aspects of implementation theory. (2008). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:161-164.

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  38. The theory of implementation : what did we learn?. (2008). Corchon, Luis.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
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  39. Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory. (2007). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
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  40. Role of Honesty in Full Implementation. (2007). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
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  41. Fault Tolerant Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies. (2007). Doghmi, Ahmed ; Ziad, Abderrahmane .
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  42. Fault Tolerant Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies. (2007). Doghmi, Ahmed ; Ziad, Abderrahmane .
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  43. Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics. (2007). Serrano, Roberto ; Cabrales, Antonio.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2007-16.

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  44. Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics. (2007). Serrano, Roberto ; Cabrales, Antonio.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
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  45. Role of Honesty in Full Implementation. (2006). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
    RePEc:tky:fseres:2006cf405.

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  46. Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems. (2004). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
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  47. Robust Mechanism Design. (2004). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
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  48. Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems ( Revised as CARF-F-062(2006) ). (2004). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CARF F-Series.
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  49. Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation. (2003). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
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  50. Robust Mechanism Design. (2003). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
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