Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard, and can therefore increase lending and reduce default rates. To test these predictions, we construct a new international data set on private credit bureaus and public credit registers. We find that bank lending is higher and proxies for default rates are lower in countries where lenders share information, regardless of the private or public nature of the information sharing mechanism. We also find that public intervention is more likely where private arrangements have not arisen spontaneously and creditor rights are poorly protected.

Keywords: information sharing; credit market; default rate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

Published in Journal of Banking and Finance, October 2002, vol. 26, issue 10, pages 2023-2054

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http://www.csef.it/WP/wp22.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information sharing, lending and defaults: Cross-country evidence (2002)
Working Paper: Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:22

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