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Effects and Mechanisms of CEOs Quality in Public Education

Victor Lavy, Genia Rachkovski and Adi Boiko

No 24028, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: ‘CEOs’ of public schools in many countries have authority and responsibilities that can greatly affect the quality of schooling. This paper estimates the impact of education CEOs on student outcomes in Israeli elementary schools. We estimate CEO quality in two ways—once using schools that don't switch CEOs and once using schools that do. We show that switches are exogenous and are not correlated with potential outcomes. CEOs' quality positively affects students’ test scores and behavioural outcomes, with pronounced effects for disadvantaged schools. Potential mechanisms show that high-quality CEOs lead to improvements in school priorities, working procedures, and violence reduction.

JEL-codes: I0 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-ure
Note: CH DEV ED
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Victor Lavy & Genia Rachkovski & Adi Boiko, 2023. "Effects and Mechanisms of CEO Quality in Public Education," The Economic Journal, vol 133(655), pages 2738-2774.

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