Migration-Induced Redistribution with and without Migrant's Voting

Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka

No 23713, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We are motivated by the unique migration experience of Israel of a supply-side shock triggering skilled immigration and the concurrent decline in welfare-state redistribution. This paper develops a model, which can provide an explanation for the mechanism through which a supply-side shock triggering high-skill migration can also reshape the political-economy balance and the redistributive policies. The paper highlights the differences in the political-economy induced redistribution policies between the cases in which migrants participate in the electoral system and the case where they do not. When migrants are allowed to vote, and they take advantage of this right, then, following the shock, all income groups gain, except low skilled immigrants who lose. When migrants are not allowed to vote, or choose not to participate in elections, all income groups gain, except the skilled migrants who lose.

JEL-codes: F22 H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-int, nep-mig and nep-pol
Note: IFM
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Related works:
Journal Article: Migration-Induced Redistribution with and without Migrants' Voting (2018)
Working Paper: Migration-Induced Redistribution with and without migrant voting (2017)
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