Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

Martin Kocher, Peter Martinsson, Kristian Ove R. Myrseth and Conny Wollbrant

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker's risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest-and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published in Experimental Economics 1 20(2017): pp. 44-69

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas (2017)
Working Paper: Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas (2013)
Working Paper: Strong, bold, and kind: Self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas (2013)
Working Paper: Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas (2013)
Working Paper: Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:55035

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