Effort-Based Career Opportunities and Working Time

Massimiliano Bratti and Stefano Staffolani

No 1474, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper we describe the hypothesis of effort-based career opportunities as a situation in which profit maximizing firms create incentives for employees to work longer hours than the bargained ones, by making career prospects dependent on working hours. When effort-based career opportunities are effective, they raise working time and output per worker reducing workers’ utility. A first attempt is made to empirically estimate the relationship between hours worked and the expected opportunities of promotion using the British Household Panel Survey data set. Our analysis shows that the perceived probability of promotion increases with working time and that this result is robust to various econometric specifications.

Keywords: promotion; working time; welfare; personnel management; career; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J22 J23 J50 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2005-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published - revised version published in: International Journal of Manpower, 2007, 28 (6), 489-512

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Related works:
Journal Article: Effort‐based career opportunities and working time (2007)
Working Paper: Effort-based career opportunities and working time (2005)
Working Paper: Effort-Based Career Opportunities and Working Time (2004)
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