Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form

Daniel Ackerberg and Maristella Botticini

Working Papers from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: Theoretical framework on contracts often identifies an "optimal" contract as a function of the characteristics of the principal and agent who are contracting. Correspondingly, empirical work on contracts often regresses contract form on observed (by the econometrician) characteristics of the principal and agent. This paper examines the econometric implications when some of the theoretically relevant characteristics are partially observed (e.g. proxied) or unobserved.

Keywords: CONTRACTS; ECONOMETRICS; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form (2002)
Working Paper: Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form (1999)
Working Paper: Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostec:96

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