Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games

Dinko Dimitrov and Shao Chin Sung
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Shao Chin Sung: Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Aoyama Gakuin University

No 2011.52, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games.

Keywords: Core; Hedonic Games; Monotonicity; Stable Sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Working Paper: Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.52

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