Big Tech Mergers

Massimo Motta () and Martin Peitz

No 14353, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Big tech mergers are frequently occurring events. What are the competitive effects of these mergers? With the help of a simple model we identify the acquisition of potential competitors as a pressing issue for merger control in digital industries. We also sketch a few novel theories of harm of horizontal and conglomerate mergers that are potentially relevant in digital industries. Finally, we draw some policy recommendations on how to deal with mergers in such industries.

Keywords: Acquisitions; Antitrust; Digital markets; Competition policy; Platforms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Big tech mergers (2021)
Working Paper: Big Tech Mergers (2020)
Working Paper: Big Tech Mergers (2020)
Working Paper: Big tech mergers (2020)
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