Partial Norms

Guido Tabellini, Giovanna d'Adda, Martin Dufwenberg and Francesco Passarelli

No 13593, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We consider an expanded notion of social norms that render them belief-dependent and partial, formulate a series of related testable predictions, and design an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game that tests for empirical relevance. Main results: Normative beliefs influence generosity, as predicted. Degree of partiality leads to more dispersion in giving behavior, as predicted.

Keywords: Social norms; Partial norms; Normative expectations; Consensus; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Working Paper: Partial Norms (2019)
Working Paper: Partial Norms (2019)
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