Sharing a collective probability of success

Pierre Dehez ()

No 3226, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: How to allocate the probability of reaching a target resulting from the joint action of a group of players? This question is framed within transferable utility games. We analyze the properties of games resulting from different scenarios, characterize their core and provide a proper axiomatic foundation to their Shapley value.

Keywords: Probability games; Core; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6
Date: 2023-05-01
Note: In: Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, vol. 123, p. 122-127
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Journal Article: Sharing a collective probability of success (2023)
Working Paper: Sharing a collective probability of success (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvrp:3226

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.03.006

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