Key players in network‐oriented interventions

Ata Atay, Ana Mauleon, Simon Schopohl and Vincent Vannetelbosch
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Simon Schopohl: Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium

No 3278, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Individuals who are embedded in a social network decide non-cooperatively how much effort to exert in supporting victims of misbehavior. Each individual’s optimal effort depends on the contextual effect, the social multiplier effect and the social conformity effect. We characterize the Nash equilibrium, and we derive an intercentrality measure for finding the key player who once isolated increases the most the aggregate effort. An individual is more likely to be the key player if she is influencing many other individuals, she is exerting a low effort because of her characteristics, and her neighbors are strongly influenced by her. The key player policy increases substantially the aggregate effort, and the targeted player should never be selected randomly. The key player is likely to remain the key player in presence of social workers except if she is becoming much less influential due to her closeness to social workers. Finally, we consider alternative policies (e.g., training bystanders for supporting victims) and compare them to the policy of isolating the key player.

Keywords: Social networks; Social support; Sexual and gender-based violence; Bullying; Peer effects; Key player; Conformity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C72 D85 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2023-08-08
Note: In: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2023, vol. 18, p. 879-907
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvrp:3278

DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00394-9

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