An Explicit Solution to Harvesting Behaviors in a Predator-Prey System

Guillaume Bataille ()
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Guillaume Bataille: Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France, https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/members/bataille

No 2405, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: This paper derives closed-form solutions for a strategic, simultaneous harvesting in a predator-prey system. Using a parametric constraint, it establishes the existence and uniqueness of a linear feedback-Nash equilibrium involving two specialized fleets and allow for continuous time results for a class of payoffs that have constant elasticity of the marginal utility. Theses results contribute to the scarce literature on analytically tractable predator-prey models with endogenous harvesting. A discussion based on industry size effects is provided to highlight the role played by biological versus strategic interactions in the multi-species context.

Keywords: fisheries; Dynamic games; common-pool resource; Predator-prey relationship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C73 Q22 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-gth and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2405

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