Testing Isomorphic Invariance Across Social Dilemma Games

Irene Maria Buso (), Lorenzo Ferreri (), Werner Güth (), Luisa Lorè () and Lorenzo Spadoni ()
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Irene Maria Buso: Department of Economics, Ca' Foscari University of Venice
Lorenzo Ferreri: Italian Competition Authority
Werner Güth: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Luisa Lorè: Department of Economics, Universität Innsbruck
Lorenzo Spadoni: Department of Economics and Law, University of Cassino and Southern Lazio

No 2023:09, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: In this study, we test whether purely behavioral aspects affect voluntary cooperativeness in Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Good Games, thereby questioning their isomorphic invariance. The experiment compares games whose identical payoffs are described as of the Prisoners' Dilemma or as of linear Public Good. Social dilemma frames are compared between subjects whereas 2- or 3-person games are compared within subjects. We either confront participants with the 2-person before the 3-person game or in reverse order, always without feedback information between rounds. The analysis rejects isomorphic invariance and shows less average cooperativeness, especially more likely free riding, in the case of the Public Good type.

Keywords: Social dilemma experiments; Isomorphic invariance; Public goods game; Prisoners' dilemma game; Voluntary cooperation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C92 D70 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mfd
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