Military Procurement, Industry Structure and Regional Conflict

John Dunne, Maria Garcia-Alonso, Paul Levine () and Ronald Smith

Studies in Economics from School of Economics, University of Kent

Abstract: In this paper, we construct a model of market structure in the global arms industry linking concentration, military procurement, international trade and regional conflict. We show how concentration depends on the willingness of producers to import for their military needs and on the relative size of the external market of non-producers. We show that there can be substantial gains to producers from cooperation in the procurement process, but also small gains to non-producers involved in regional arms races. Arms export controls that limit the level of technology that can be exported to non-producers distribute these cooperative gains from producers to non-producers.

Keywords: military procurement; market structure; arms trade; arms races (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 H56 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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