Knowledge diffusion under patent with asymmetric firms

Arijit Mukherjee and Uday Sinha

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 12, issue 9, 1-6

Abstract: We show that if patent protection and trade secrecy generate asymmetric market structure, an innovator may prefer patent protection than trade secrecy even if the diffusion probability is higher under the former but it increases market concentration by preventing some imitators. So, whether an innovator prefers patent protection or trade secrecy depends on the trade-off between the diffusion probability and market concentration.

JEL-codes: L5 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04-18
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