~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ADF Serials Newsletter
For those interested in Australian Military Aircraft History and Serials
January 2003
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
in this issue
-- Sabres in RAAF Service - a brief history
-- Indonesian Sabres (ex RAAF) Can you help?
-- SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 1 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
-- SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 2 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
-- Have You Ever Wondered About the Histories of Those Old Planes on TV? - Gordon B
-- A trip down Memory Lane...
-- Neptune Modifications - SARAH revealed!
-- ADF Serials New Members
-- Can you help us identify this Anson?
-- Your Feedback
-- Do you have something for us?
Welcome to our first newsletter for 2003. This month
the newsletter features the Sabre aircraft with a short
history of its service with the RAAF, a request for
information on one of the RAAF Sabres which was sold
to the Indonesian Air Force in 1973 and an accident
report involving Sabre aircraft at Quirindi NSW.
Sabres in RAAF Service - a brief history
Gordon B looks at the Lockheed 12A, Sidney Cotton's
role in reconnaissance and ends with a section on plane
spotting from the comfort of your lounge chair.
There is also a walk down Memory Lane - many RAAF
bases and parks have old RAAF aircraft as static
displays? Have you looked at one and wondered about
its history? Wynnum has provided a photo of Meteor
A77-702 which was displayed outside RAAF Laverton
during the 1960's and 1970's.
If you have a photo of any military aircraft on static
display please email jan_adf-serials.com and we can
included it in the newsletter.
Last month's newsletter contained a plea about
information re SARAH. Read on to see who or what
Sarah was.
The group also needs assistance in finding out more
about Anson VH-FIA. Can you help with details of its
military life?
Till next month
Jan
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- The installation of Rolls Royce Avon turbojet engines and modified air intakes to accommodate the larger engine
- Revised cockpit layout
- Increased fuel capacity
- Installation of two 30mm cannons under the cockpit instead of 6 0.5 calibre machine guns mounted around the nose
The first Australian built Avon Sabre flew on 3 August 1953 and during its test flight, it became the first aircraft in Australia to break the sound barrier. 75 Sqn, reformed in March 1955, took delivery of its Sabre aircraft on 4 Apr 1955 at RAAF Williamtown. 3 Sqn received its first Sabres on 1 March 1956 and 77 Sqn on 19 November 1956. During the Malayan Emergency, Sabres saw service in Malaysia with 3 Sqn deployed in 1958 and 77 Sqn in 1959. Sabres flew missions against the communist insurgents until 1960. In 1962, a detachment (later designated 79 Sqn) of 8 Sabres deployed from Butterworth to Ubon (Thailand) to assist with action against communist activity. During their period of service with the RAAF, the Sabre flew with 2OCU, 5OCU, ARDU, 3, 75, 76, 77 and 79 Sqns. The Sabre aircraft were used by the Black Panther aerobatic team and to many, they are still widely regarded as the best combat aircraft produced in Australia. [Nothing beats the Mirage in my humble opinion, Editor] In 1965 the phasing out of Sabre aircraft began as the RAAF took delivery of the Mirage III-A. By July 1971, the RAAF had officially retired the Sabre from service. However, many of the Sabres continued life with other airforces. In October 1969, ten Sabres were handed over to the Royal Malaysian Air Force, with a further six delivered in 1971. Additionally, in February 1973, 16 Sabres entered service with the Indonesian Air Force. Which leads us to....
Indonesian Sabres (ex RAAF) Can you help?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Click here to see image of F8623
SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 1 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(Article reproduced courtesy of Directorate of Flying
Safety-Air Force with special thanks to Mr John
Crawley)
At 1300 hrs on the 19th September 1964, four Sabre
aircraft of No 2 (Fighter) Operational Conversion Unit,
based at RAAF Williamtown, took off on a "round
robin" flypast exercise planned as part of Air Force
Week celebrations. The planned route was to take
them over nine NSW towns, including Quirindi airfield
and township, prior to returning to Williamtown. Arrival
at Quirindi was planned to coincide with a local air
pageant and would involve a number of flypasts in
various formations as part of the pageant.
The mission proceeded as planned to Quirindi (the fifth
town) where the briefed flypasts, in different
formations, was begun. At about 1403 hrs, after
completing a pass in box formation and two passes in
low level battle formation, the aircraft were called into
close formation for the final flypast.
While rejoining into close formation the No 2 aircraft,
A94-355 collided with the lead aircraft, A94-356. The
No 2 aircraft impacted the ground five seconds
after the collision killing the pilot. The lead aircraft was
only slightly damaged and landed safely at Tamworth.
The remainder of the formation returned directly to
Williamtown.
The flight was one of a number of commitments
accepted by the RAAF as a part of Air Force Week.
However, because of urgent, unexpected operational
tasks that has arisen since accepting the flypast
commitment, No 2 (F)OCU lacked sufficient staff pilots
to fly all the Air Force Week missions as well as routine
training exercises. It was thus decided to utilise two
student members of the senior conversion course in the
flypast mission, to make up the required section of four
aircraft. One of those selected was an experienced
pilot with previous Sabre experience, who was deemed
to be the most capable of the remaining pilots on the
course.
At the briefing, all flight members were issued with
prepared maps of the proposed route. All relevant
details, such as route to be flown, timing, anticipated
fuel consumption, reporting procedures etc were
covered.
Considerable emphasis was placed on the two types of
formation to be flown - low level battle formation and
close box formation.
The sequence to be flown over Quirindi consisted of a
flypast at 500 ft AGL in a box formation, spreading into
a low level battle formation for further passes over the
airfield, reforming again into box formation with wheels
down for a final pass, and then departure for Scone.
The leader briefed that all power changes, formation
changes, turns, use of speed brakes, and undercarriage
selections would be called over the radio. A blackboard
diagram was used to illustrate the types of formation,
positions of members in the formation, and movement
of the members of the formation during turns.
Duration of the flight was expected to be 1.25 hrs. The
weather conditions prevailing at Quirindi for the flypasts
were mainly cloudless, light winds, light turbulence and
good visibility.
Aircrew :
Formation Leader: an experienced Sabre pilot with in
excess of 1 000 hrs on type. He was also an FCI.
No 2: The pilot of the No 2 (accident) aircraft had
accumulated 307 hrs total flying time, including 48 hrs
on Sabre aircraft. He had been repeatedly assessed as
an outstanding cadet during his basic training and won
the Goble Trophy for best overall pilot on his course.
During the Sabre operational conversion course he had
exhibited a great deal of natural ability and
determination. He had made good progress throughout
the course, having completed the pure conversion
segment, and was coping quite well with the more
advanced tactics phase. He had successfully covered
all aspects of tactical and close formation flying with
only minor faults.
The accident:
The accident occurred two miles from Quirindi airfield
and was witnessed by some 2500 spectators at Quirindi
airfield, as well as CAA officials and others involved in
the organising of the local pageant. Other
witnesses closer to the crash location, include two
other members of the formation.
The pilot of the lead aircraft stated that as he passed
over the airfield on the second pass, he called for
speed brakes out. He was then level and also called
that he was reducing power. Shortly after, while in a
gentle 20 degree bank to starboard and climbing away
gradually, he called for "box formation go".
The leader was, by now, looking out generally, in
anticipation of initiating a left turn for the final pass
over the airfield. Suddenly he felt a noticeable bump on
his port wing and observed a shadow in his peripheral
vision. No alterations to the aircraft's handling
characteristics were noted.
Following a query from the No 3 aircraft, the leader
looked out at the port wing and confirmed that he had
been hit. On steepening up to the starboard, he saw
wreckage of A94-355 on the ground.
The pilot of the No 4 aircraft was the furthest pilot in
the formation from the two aircraft involved in the
collision, some 200 feet directly astern of his leader.
Nevertheless, he had the best view of the two
aircraft involved. He stated that moments earlier both
he and the accident pilot had delayed opening of speed
brakes to assist in catching up to the lead
aircraft. Then, while he (No 4) had begun to regulate
his closing on the lead aircraft, the No 2 aircraft had
maintained a considerable closing speed. The
pilot of the lead aircraft had, by this time, started a
gentle turn to starboard and No 2 overshot his leader
and appeared to pass slightly in front of and above
the lead aircraft. It appeared to No 4 that No 2 was
taking his aircraft to the outside of the turn to wash off
excess overtake. No 2 then banked sharply to
starboard and his starboard wingtip hit the leader's left
wing.
According to the No 4 pilot, while the lead aircraft
maintained its flight path and appeared to be
unaffected by the collision, the No 2 aircraft yawed
sharply to the right, slightly above and in front of the
lead aircraft, and about four feet of the right wing tip
broke off with other parts also shredding from the
damaged wing. The aircraft then rolled very rapidly to
the right and passed underneath the lead aircraft. As it
fell away from the formation it quickly became inverted,
with the nose pointing down.
At this point No 4 briefly lost sight of No 2. When re-
acquired the aircraft was flying straight and level
approximately 20 degrees to the left of the formation
heading and about 10 feet above ground level, in a
slightly nose up attitude, yawing slightly and travelling
parallel with the ground. It seemed that it was about to
land and, just when it appeared to be touching down,
it rolled rapidly to the right and impacted the ground on
its right wing.
The pilot of the No 3 aircraft generally confirmed this
sequence of events. Some 30 seconds after the call to
rejoin for box formation, he was moving into the
echelon left position when he noticed No 2 come
quickly into view almost immediately above the lead
aircraft. It was banked to starboard at an angle of
about 90 degrees. At this time the lead aircraft was in
a climbing turn to starboard. No 2 then appeared to roll
rapidly, slightly in front of the lead aircraft and so close
that No 3 thought their wings may have touched.
Moments later, the No 2 aircraft went inverted and
passed from view.
After A94-355 impacted the ground, progressively
disintegration of the right wing occurred and a fire
started soon after. The aircraft rolled inverted onto the
canopy area, before rolling and tumbling along the
ground.
Distribution of the wreckage was quite random and
simply indicated a high degree of disintegration and
dispersion due to speed at impact, the initial impact
angle and the rolling/tumbling progress of the aircraft
along the ground.
There was ample evidence to show that, in the final
moments, the pilot attempted ejection.
SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 2 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
As is sometimes the case in accident investigations,
physical evidence at the crash site conflicted with
what was given by eyewitnesses. In this instance, the
evidence of the No 4 pilot regarding a significant part of
A94-355's right wing separating after the midair collision
was not consistent with the evidence obtained during
the wreckage inspection. The starboard wing,
including the tip and outer section of the aileron were
still attached to the aircraft when it impacted the
ground.
In order to establish exactly what damage was inflicted
on A94-355 by the collision, and to what extent
effective control could have been maintained by the
pilot, all the recovered portions of the right wing were
collected and reconstructed. From this reconstruction,
it was established amongst other things, that:
- The right mainplane, flap and aileron, with the exception of that part of the aileron inboard of the aileron centre hinge and aileron jack, were still attached to the aircraft when it crashed.
- Neither the aileron jack nor the hydraulic lines of either the normal or alternate control systems to the jack were damaged by the collision.
- Since the centre hinge incorporates the actuating arm of the aileron jack, the outboard arm of the aileron would have responded in the normal way to control column deflections, contributing effectively to the lateral control available to the pilot.
The control problem Although the left aileron was intact and the remaining section of the right aileron was contributing to effective lateral control, the pilot of A94-355 still had a control problem. From the damage to the leader's aircraft and from scrape and scoring marks on the undersurface of the wingtip of A94-355 it was clear that the major forces of the collision acted on an area of the aircraft's right wing, behind a line approximately joining the centre aileron hinge and the pitot head. The impact resulted in distortion of the wing behind that outboard section of the aileron were bent up, thus placing the section of the wing at a marked negative angle of incidence. This, effectively, would have produced a powerful rolling tendency to the right.
Both members of the formation who saw the collision commented on the aircraft's rapid roll to the right. It is highly probable that the pilot, on sighting the lead aircraft so close, or on feeling the impact, instinctively pulled back on the control column to break away. This would have produced a sudden increase in angle of attack and, because of the damaged tip of the starboard wing, would have increased the lift differential between the left and right wings (provided they were not stalled). The end result would have been a powerful tendency to the right. This would explain the rapid roll which placed the aircraft in the inverted position before the pilot was able to correct.
At this point, it is considered that the accident pilot moved the control column forward, in the belief that the rapid roll was induced by a stall or flick. This would result in a reduced rate of roll and, by the time the aircraft was approaching the upright position, he was able to check the roll with the left aileron.
That this would be possible, even with the damage believed to have resulted from the collision, had been demonstrated in previous instances of Sabre collisions. That the pilot was able to stop the roll is borne out by No 4's statement and by several ground observers witnesses stated that the aircraft was either "gliding down" or appeared to be attempting a landing.
Pilot's attempted ejection While the accident pilot's aircraft was badly damaged ion the collision, it should have been controllable, confirmed by the fact that the pilot did regain control for a brief period before crashing. Examination showed that the engine was operating normally at higher that 6000 rpm immediately prior to impact. Why then, was the pilot unable to retain control of the aircraft and gain height for a safe ejection?
Given time to consider his actions, or experience to temper his judgment, a pilot in this situation should have survived. The accident pilot had very little of both. Having regained some control over the aircraft, he was most concerned about the continued difficulty in maintaining level flight. Opening the throttle once level flight was attained was almost automatic. Up to this point his attention would have been directed entirely towards achieving a safe attitude, but once level, he probably glanced out at the "heavy" starboard wing and saw the damaged wingtip and the sizeable gap in the trailing edge.
Realising for the first time that the aircraft was seriously damaged and suspecting what control he had could fail at any second, the pilot might have thought that ejection offered the best chance for survival. At this point, he released the controls and tried to eject by raising both seat handles; however the aircraft rolled rapidly to the right and the right wing struck the ground.
The condition of the ejection seat supports this probability. Both seat handles were fully up and locked. The canopy breaker bolt and spring were found out of the breaker frame, both bent in a manner consistent with their having been on the way out of their casing as the aircraft rolled to the inverted position and crashed onto the canopy.
Having elected to try and eject, the pilot had hold of both firing handles by the time the aircraft first struck the ground. Either from sheer desperation, or as a result of the crash forces, he continued the action of pulling the handles to the fully up position. While this was happening, the aircraft continued to roll to the inverted position and crashed onto the canopy as the breaker bolt and spring were clearing their casing. By the time the main initiators fired, the main initiator hose had separated from the M-5 catapult, and the seat firing sequence was interrupted.
What went wrong? From the evidence of the pilots of the No3 and No 4 aircraft in the formation, it became apparent that in attempting to move quickly from his low level battle formation position into echelon right (the briefed position when box formation was called), the accident pilot misjudged his overtake, and was embarrassed by a marked overshoot - not an unusual occurrence - even with experienced pilots. For an inexperienced pilot, possibly overawed by his first appearance in a public display, and anxious to impress by demonstrating his ability to move quickly from one formation position to another, it represents an error of judgment.
In a situation where the leader does not have speed brakes extended, such an overshoot is usually quite easily corrected with speed brakes and/or by reducing power. In this case however, the leader had his speed brakes extended and had reduced power in order to slow down and lower the undercarriage for the final flypast in box formation. To correct an overshoot in this situation, with no drag differential and only a small power differential between the leader and the overtaking aircraft, required some form of lateral manoeuvring to enable the overshooting aircraft to fall back while washing off excess airspeed.
The evidence suggests that the accident pilot decided to cross to the left side and back to the right side to correct the overshoot. In doing so he elected to cross over, rather than under, his leader's flight path. This is a highly dangerous practice, in that the pilot loses sight of the lead aircraft when manoeuvring close to it, and was contrary to the established technique taught at the unit, which required the wingman to manoeuvre with his leader in sight at all times.
Two factors which must be considered as having contributed to the accident are the pilot's inexperience, and the fact that he had been airborne on a low level formation flying sortie for an hour when the collision occurred. It is an established fact that an inexperienced pilot tires more rapidly than an experienced pilot when engaged in missions requiring continued concentration, such as formation flying. The experienced pilot can relax more readily and his reflexes respond more or less automatically. The less experienced pilot must retain concentration at a higher level and does not relax readily. This could explain the lapse which caused the pilot to lose sight of his leader.
Summary The pilot of A94-355 used an incorrect technique to correct an earlier error of judgment when joining up with his leader into echelon right formation. As a result, he lost sight of the other aircraft and, instead of pulling well clear, tried to judge the relative position of the other aircraft and dropped his right wing to check visually. As a result, his right aileron struck the top of the lead aircraft's wing.
The damage to the lead aircraft was relatively slight and the leader was able to land safely. However, as a result of the damage to the right wing and aileron of A94-355, the pilot lost control of the aircraft which rolled rapidly to the right and descended to a very low altitude. The pilot then regained control of the aircraft and, either from sheer panic or because of difficulties, decided to eject. When he released the controls to operate both seat firing handles, the aircraft rolled rapidly to the right and impacted the ground before the ejection sequence was completed. In any case, the altitude at which he decided to eject precluded any chance of success, had the seat successfully cleared the aircraft.
Two factors which contributed to the accident were the pilot's inexperience, and fatigue from the relatively long period he had been flying at low level in formation before the collision occurred.
The tragedy of such an accident is made all the more bitter because both the collision and the loss of the pilot resulted from his own mistakes. Almost any other course of action would have given him a greater chance of survival. Sufficient power and control was available to permit as climb to a safe ejection altitude. On the other hand, the pilot could well have walked away from the aircraft had he elected to make a controlled crash landing straight ahead.
No doubt the pilot did make the wrong decision at the critical time but, considering the circumstances, who can blame him?
Have You Ever Wondered About the Histories of Those Old Planes on TV? - Gordon B
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Story goes back to 1938 when the war clouds
were gathering in Europe, when under F.W.
Winterbotham, (an ex-SqnLdr who pioneered RAF Aerial
Photo reconnaissance in WW1) who was now the Chief
of Air, Directorate of the Secret Inteligence Service
(SIS) was becoming increasingly aware of the short fall
of Anglo-French aerial reconnaissance of the period.
This resulted in late 1938, with the SIS, the French
Secret Service, the American Armament Corporation,
and a Business Associate of the latter, Mr F.S. Cotton
to negotiate forming a special reconnaissance system
to fulfil their needs. Cotton's background, an ex-Royal
Naval Aviation Service Pilot in World War 1, and his
subsequent post war aviation experiences of flying all
over Europe regularly, made him a prominent figure in
this collaboration.
A private company, Aeronautical Research and Sales
Corporation was formed as a cover to conceal its true
endeavours in 1939, and a Lockheed 12A was ordered
from the USA.
After assembly in the UK, it was used for several cross
border flights to the Ruhr, Italy and North Africa
between 25th March to 25th April 1939. No further
History could be found on its identity or use.
Two further Lockheed 12A's were purchased, one being
handed over to the French( no further details found)
and the other extensively modified for use by Cotton.
Built as a Lockheed 12A, this particular a/c, c/n1203,
was delivered to Continental Oil Company on the 1st
October 1936 for use by its subsidiary company,
Horchbach Drilling Company. During March 1939,
Cotton, under the auspices cover of the British Airways
Ltd (not the BA of today) purchased it. It arrived on
the 24/04/39 in the UK for assembly by Cunliffe-Owen
Aircraft Ltd at Eastleigh in Southampton. What was
peculiar to the final finish, was the colour,.......duck
egg green, later used on those PRU Spitfires.
On the 15th of May, 1939 she was issued with a
Certificate of Registration, #9098, and became G-AFTL
on the register. Following the acceptance, she was
returned to Airwork Ltd at Heston to have her "Special
Mods" done. These included two extra 70 Gallon tanks
to increase her range from 700 miles to 1600 miles, plus
the installation of three RAF F24 Cameras. One was
mounted vertically, with the other two mounted 40
degrees offset in the fuselage so that at an altitude of
21000 feet, it could provide overlapping images up to
11 miles on its trek.
Much has been written on its service use, albeit short,
but it culminated on the night of the 19th September
1940 when the Luftwaffe dropped parachute mines on
the Hanger at Heston. Due to the extensive damage
she suffered, she was crated up and shipped to
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation at Burbank, California the
following month. Surviving U-Boats, she emerged after
her re-build there on the 21st November 1942 with the
export registration of NX21707, to be flown from Miami
Florida, to her new owner in the British Honduras,
Lowell Yerex as VP-TAI.
She was purchased by British West Indian Airways on
the 5th January 1943 and used up till April 1948, when
it was purchased by Dan Hartman of Florida USA. She
became N1161V.
After several owners in the States, she became N12EJ
in 1991 when she was bought by Steve Oliver of
Oregon. It's still there today,.......and guess
what,....it's for sale at only for a mere US $425000.00
Aviation History bickering!!!!!
HAVE YOU SEEN THIS LOCKHEED ON TV OR IN THE
MOVIES?
YES, YOU HAVE!
Doc Savage TV series
The Amelia Earhart Story
The Howard Hughes Story
Moonlighting
Spencer's Pilots
The "A" Team
Got a spare $425,000 for this plane?
A trip down Memory Lane...
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
We would like to hear from anyone that can fill us in
on its activities especially between 1963 and 1971
Please Email jan@adf-serials.com
Neptune Modifications - SARAH revealed!
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ADF Serials New Members
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
We would like to welcome two new members of the ADF
serials team. Graham Higgs - who is assisting with
images and Ron Wynn who is working on the A-8
Beaufighter page.
Can you help us identify this Anson?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Does anyone have any information about this Anson's
military history? It's civil registration is VH-FIA. If you
can please email darren@adf-serials.com
Click here to see image of VH-FIA
Your Feedback
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
We value the feedback of the people who visit our
website and those who read this newsletter, if you
would like to tell us what you think of the website or
newsletter please click on the link below.
: Feedback on ADF Serials Website
Roy Nixon passed on the following:
Many thanks Dean for your help re.S/L PA Dey.I will
pass this on to P/O Ewans 276ASR sqn who will be most
interested. What a splendid user friendly site. I cannot
wait to return!
[Sqn Leader Phillip Alexander Dey and the crew of
Beaufort A9-625 were killed on 16 March 1945 when
their aircraft exploded in mid-air, But West New Guinea]
Don Clark submitted the followng comments.
Subject: Feedback on ADF Serials Website
Comments: Revisiting this site after some time, I'm
once more impressed with how well organised,
comprehensive and accessible it is. This is a
really valuable resource, reflecting a lot of work behind
the scenes. Thank you very much indeed.
Link to provide feeback on the website
Hits to this Page since 22/05/03.
Hits to ADF Serials Website