[go: up one dir, main page]

Access Statistics for Johannes Hörner

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk 0 1 2 125 0 1 2 352
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 144
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 200
Belief-free Price Formation 0 0 0 19 1 2 4 85
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 13
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 35
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 8
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 140
Biased Social Learning 0 0 0 49 0 0 2 177
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 113
Career Concerns and Market Structure 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 84
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 53 0 0 1 132
Career Concerns with Coarse Information 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 114
Career Concerns with Exponential Learning 1 1 1 40 2 3 12 101
Collaborating 0 0 0 121 0 0 0 278
Collaborating 0 0 1 15 0 0 3 128
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 36 0 1 3 63
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 49
Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment 0 0 0 40 0 0 1 57
Dynamic sender receiver games 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 15
Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? 0 0 0 13 0 2 2 24
How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games" 0 1 1 26 0 1 1 51
How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 28
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 47
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 63
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 157
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 28
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 16
Incentives for Experimenting Agents 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 55
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 32 0 0 1 46
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 66
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 44
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 49
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 90
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 61
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 60
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 139
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 50
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 24 0 0 4 53
Mediation and Peace 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 73
Motivational Ratings 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 82
On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 92 0 0 0 168
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information 0 0 0 72 0 0 0 184
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 0 26 0 0 1 108
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games 0 0 0 26 0 0 1 55
Optimal Design for Social Learning 0 0 1 22 0 1 4 78
Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions 0 1 3 80 0 3 7 256
Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 27
Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance 0 0 0 85 0 1 1 351
Public enterprises and labor market performance 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 37
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 229
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 26
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 2 7 0 0 2 58
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 78 0 0 0 247
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 46
Reputation and Competition 0 0 0 44 0 0 1 122
Reputation and Competition' 0 0 0 540 0 0 1 934
Selling Information 0 0 1 39 0 0 1 182
Selling Information 0 0 0 5 2 7 16 114
Selling Information 0 0 1 77 0 0 3 103
Selling Information 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 169
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 71
Should Auctions Be Transparent? 0 0 0 9 0 1 1 106
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 125 0 0 0 37
Should Auctions be Transparent? 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 122
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit 0 0 0 181 0 0 0 842
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 77 1 1 1 60
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 64
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games 0 0 0 19 0 1 1 115
Supervised Social Learning 0 0 0 9 0 0 4 44
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 46 0 0 1 143
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 37
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 46
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 49
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 97
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 18 0 1 2 53
The Wisdom of the Minority 0 0 0 106 1 2 5 267
The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring 0 0 1 43 0 1 2 263
The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 35
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 33 0 0 1 65
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 1 85 0 0 1 82
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 40
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 32
Total Working Papers 1 4 15 3,483 7 36 115 9,797

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead 0 0 0 5 1 1 3 34
A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels 0 1 1 31 0 1 2 135
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 112
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 1 180 0 0 1 571
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence 0 0 0 12 0 1 1 59
Biased social learning 0 0 2 14 1 2 6 92
Career concerns with exponential learning 0 0 1 8 0 0 2 69
Coase and Hotelling: A Meeting of the Minds 1 1 1 14 1 1 2 197
Collaborating 0 0 0 83 0 0 2 308
Collusion with (almost) no information 0 0 0 6 1 1 2 29
Costly Signalling in Auctions -super-1 0 0 0 91 2 2 3 321
How Robust is the Folk Theorem? 0 0 0 21 0 0 3 188
How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? 0 0 2 3 0 0 3 31
Incentives for experimenting agents 0 1 2 6 0 1 4 69
Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 65
Managing Strategic Buyers 0 0 2 80 0 0 4 426
Mediation, arbitration and negotiation 2 5 14 306 7 17 57 1,345
On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 14
On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games 0 1 1 12 0 2 4 54
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE 0 0 0 52 0 2 2 219
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 59 0 0 1 231
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 173
Report of the Editor: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 82
Reputation and Competition 0 1 1 484 0 1 11 1,288
Selling Information 0 2 6 102 2 6 21 394
Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders 0 0 1 66 0 0 3 174
Specialized Careers 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 40
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 1 139 0 1 4 328
The role of commitment in bilateral trade 0 0 0 17 0 2 2 70
The wisdom of the minority 0 0 0 91 2 6 14 252
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 87
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 0 0 0 19 0 1 1 88
Total Journal Articles 3 12 36 1,954 17 48 163 7,545

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2024-12-04