Paper 2002/035
Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings
Sattam S. Al-Riyami and Kenneth G. Paterson
Abstract
Joux's protocol is a one round, tripartite key agreement protocol that is more bandwidth-efficient than any previous three-party key agreement protocol. But it is insecure, suffering from a simple man-in-the-middle attack. This paper shows how to make Joux's protocol secure, presenting several tripartite, authenticated key agreement protocols that still require only one round of communication. A pass-optimal authenticated and key confirmed tripartite protocol that generalises the station-to-station protocol is also presented. The security properties of the new protocols are studied using provable security methods and heuristic approaches. Applications for the protocols are also discussed.
Note: Revision to earlier version of paper to include more detailed security analysis and analysis of confirmed protocols.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Secure protocolskey agreementauthenticationpairings
- Contact author(s)
- kenny paterson @ rhul ac uk
- History
- 2003-04-16: revised
- 2002-03-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2002/035
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/035,
author = {Sattam S. Al-Riyami and Kenneth G. Paterson},
title = {Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/035},
year = {2002},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/035}
}