Paper 2004/221
Towards Plaintext-Aware Public-Key Encryption without Random Oracles
Mihir Bellare and Adriana Palacio
Abstract
We consider the problem of defining and achieving plaintext-aware encryption without random oracles in the classical public-key model. We provide definitions for a hierarchy of notions of increasing strength: PA0, PA1 and PA2, chosen so that PA1+IND-CPA => IND-CCA1 and PA2+IND-CPA => IND-CCA2. Towards achieving the new notions of plaintext awareness, we show that a scheme due to Damgard, denoted DEG, and the ``lite'' version of the Cramer-Shoup scheme, denoted CSL, are both PA0 under the KEA0 assumption of Damgard, and PA1 under an extension of this assumption called KEA1. As a result, DEG is the most efficient proven IND-CCA1 scheme known.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF PS
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. An extended abstract of this paper appears in the proceedings of the Asiacrypt 2004 conference. This is the full version.
- Keywords
- encryptionchosen-ciphertext attacksplaintext awareness
- Contact author(s)
- mihir @ cs ucsd edu
- History
- 2004-09-02: revised
- 2004-09-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/221
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/221,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Adriana Palacio},
title = {Towards Plaintext-Aware Public-Key Encryption without Random Oracles},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/221},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/221}
}