Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis

Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach and Eric Friedman

No 297, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan

Abstract: The "Asian Crisis" of 1997-98 affected all the "emerging markets" open to capital flows. Measures of corporate governance, particularly the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders, explain the extent of depreciation and stock market decline better than do standard macroeconomic measures. A possible explanation is that in countries with weak corporate governance, worse economic prospects result in more expropriation by managers and thus a larger fall in asset prices.

Pages: pages
Date: 1999-11-01
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Journal Article: Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis (2000)
Working Paper: Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis (1999)
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