Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization
Simon Anderson and
Nicolas Schmitt
Virginia Economics Online Papers from University of Virginia, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce non-tariff barriers when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. We then show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from using tariffs only to quotas, and to antidumping constraints (when quotas are jointly eliminated). Second, there is a narrowing of the range of industries in which each instrument is used. Third,the degree of tariff liberalization and of replacement of tariffs by NTBs depend on industry characteristics.These results are roughly in line with the empirical evidence.
Keywords: Tariffs; Trade Policy; Reciprocal Dumping; Quotas; Antidumping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2000-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.as.virginia.edu/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap340.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Nontariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization (2003)
Working Paper: Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vir:virpap:340
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Virginia Economics Online Papers from University of Virginia, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Debby Stanford ().